The historical narrative of Barry Friedman's The Will of the People is strongly suggestive of a Supreme Court that responds to majoritarian preferences. Friedman's narrative, however, leaves open the question of the source of this responsiveness. An analysis of the Court's decisions in cases involving the constitutional review of federal statutes from the Warren through the Rehnquist Courts does not support the claim that the Court responds to public opinion per se, independently of congressional preferences. Instead, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the Court responds to the institutional incentives created by congressional leverage over the Court. These results should redirect our attention to the importance of institutional rules for incentivizing judges into responsiveness to majoritarian preferences.
I. THE MAJORITARIAN COURT
It is extremely difficult to walk away from the beautifully written historical narrative that is Barry Friedman's The Will of the People without being convinced of its central point: the Supreme Court is extraordinarily [Vol. 2010:729 responsive to the preferences of political majorities.
1 Friedman is not the first to make this claim; at least since Robert Dahl's widely cited 1957 article, 2 political scientists have found evidence that the Court responds to majoritarian preferences through a variety of causal mechanisms.
3 But The Will of the People has a broader historical sweep than any previous work, and will certainly have a wider audience.
What is less clear from Friedman's narrative is why the Court should be so responsive to majoritarian preferences. Perhaps the preferences of the justices evolve along with those of electoral majorities as new appointees, reflecting the preferences of the current president and Senate, replace justices representing the preferences of past electoral majorities. 4 Perhaps the justices respond to the threat of congressional sanctions, such as impeachment, should their decisions veer too far from congressional preferences.
5
Or perhaps the justices respond to public opinion directly, either out of a Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 279-95 (1957) . Dahl suggested that the Court's apparent responsiveness to majoritarian preferences was a function of the change in the justices' preferences induced by the appointment process. Id. at 284-85.
3. Those who have found judicial responsiveness to majoritarian congressional preferences as a function of the threat of congressional sanctions include Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987 -2000 , 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 533-62 (2006 desire to be popular, or in an attempt to avoid widespread noncompliance with their decisions.
6
Although Friedman acknowledges the possibility of all of these causal mechanisms, his particular favorite appears to be the last of the three: the justices respond to public opinion directly. He seeks to distinguish his story from that told by " [p] olitical scientists in particular [who] tend to focus on the institutions of government, rather than the people at large." 7 Instead, he sees the Court as responding directly to public opinion trends, independently of judicial or congressional preferences. For example, the Rehnquist Court's conservative shift after 1994 is characterized, at least in part, as a direct response to public opinion: "[T]he justices were following social trends and by doing so were often deciding cases consistent with public opinion. . . . [T] he American public was by all accounts well behind the idea of devolving power to the states."
8
Friedman extols the virtues of this direct, unmediated conversation between the Court and "the American people," asserting that:
[i]t is through the process of judicial responsiveness to public opinion that the meaning of the Constitution takes shape. . . . [T] he central function of judicial review today is to serve as the catalyst for the people to take their Constitution seriously, to develop their constitutional sensibilities, in the hope that they will adhere to those sensibilities when the chips are down." In the book's final formulation of this idea, he writes, "we are the highest court in the land." 10 Friedman's claim of an independent effect of public opinion on the Court's decisions is an intriguing one, with powerful normative implications. If true, it would imply that institutional design is not particularly relevant for inducing judicial responsiveness to majoritarian preferences. Even the most insulated, anti-majoritarian judges could still be trusted to respond to majoritarian preferences through a direct effect of public opinion on their decisions. Given what we know about the policy choices made by 6 . See sources cited supra notes 2-3. 7. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 375. Friedman discounts the institutional incentives faced by the Court, for example characterizing the Court during the Progressive era as "insulated," id. at 173, and "unchecked," id. at 182, and asserting that the Court has considerable "independence," id. at 379. 8 . Id. at 354, 357. 9 . Id. at 383, 384. 10 . Id. at 385; see also id. at 381 ("What matters most about judicial review . . . is not the Supreme Court's role in the process, but how the public reacts to those decisions."); id. at 383 (" [W] hat the Supreme Court responds to most often is the sustained voice of the people as expressed through the long process of contesting constitutional decisions."); id. at 384 ("give-and-take between the courts and the people").
insulated, anti-majoritarian political leaders, this would perhaps be welcome news.
11
In order to sort out the relative causal weights that should be given to judicial preferences, congressional preferences, and public opinion, I estimate the responsiveness of the Court's judgments to these three influences in cases involving the constitutional review of federal statutes from the Warren through the Rehnquist Courts. It turns out that there is no support for an independent effect of public opinion on the Court's judgments, controlling for both judicial and congressional preferences.
12 There is, however, a large effect of congressional preferences on the Court's decisions, an effect that wholly accounts for the rightward shift in the Rehnquist Court's judgments observed in its post-1993 terms.
13 These results should redirect our attention to the importance of institutional rules for incentivizing judicial responsiveness to majoritarian preferences.
II. PUBLIC OPINION, CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCES, AND THE SUPREME COURT
The hypothesis that public opinion may influence the Court's decisions has frequently been tested in empirical literature on the United States Supreme Court. 14 However, perhaps surprisingly, most of these studies have not controlled for the preferences of the elected branches. 15 Obviously, to the extent that popular preferences are correlated with elected branch preferences, an apparent direct influence of public opinion on the Court's decisions may simply reflect a spurious correlation.
Likewise, studies that have found effects of congressional preferences on the Court's judgments in constitutional cases have not controlled for a direct effect of public opinion. 16 Again, without including this control, we do not know whether the reported effects of congressional preferences are instead due to a direct effect from public opinion.
Only three studies, now somewhat dated, have estimated the influence of public opinion on the Court's judgments while controlling for elected branch preferences. 17 All three found evidence of a direct effect for public opinion. However, these studies used measures of both the Court's judgments and judicial and congressional preferences upon which we can improve.
First, all three studies measured the Court's judgments using the Supreme Court Database direction of decision variable that codes each judgment as "liberal" or "conservative."
18 These codes are assigned subjectively, in a process that accords a great deal of discretion to the coder. The judgment codes may thus incorporate expectations about the kinds of decisions typically issued by more liberal and more conservative courts. They are then not well-suited for empirical analyses of external influences on the justices' decisions.
19
Second, all three studies used measures of judicial and elected branch preferences that have largely been superseded by more modern preference estimates. 20 In particular, there are now available preference estimates that scale both congressional and judicial preferences in the same policy space. These estimates can be used to more precisely specify spatial models of congressional influence on the Court. These roll call coordinates tell us whether the statute in question moved the status quo ex ante in a liberal or a conservative direction.
III. MEASURING THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENTS
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The Court's dispositions of these statutes then either preserve the direction of movement of the original status quo (by upholding a statute), or reverse the direction of that movement (by striking a statute, causing policy to revert to the original status quo ex ante). I use this information to construct a dichotomous measure of the direction of the Court's judgments in these cases, one that is free from subjective coding bias. I adopt the Supreme Court Database convention of coding liberal judgments as 1 and conservative judgments as 0. 445-46 (2007) . The initial pool of cases was generated in the Supreme Court Database by selecting all records wherein the authority for the decision was cited as judicial review (AUTHDEC1 or AUTHDEC2 = 1) for the 1953-2001 terms. Cases were discarded if no entry in the LAW variable for any record referred to a federal statute. Cases were then read to ensure that each involved a constitutional challenge to a federal statute.
22. These statutes have been frequently amended. The decision rule used was to first identify the specific section or sections of the statute actually being reviewed by the Court, and then to identify both the original enacting date and all reenactments of or amendments to this section or sections. As long as the challenged language of the statute remained substantially intact through all amendments and/or reenactments, the most recent reenacting or amending Congress was adopted as the enacting Congress. Cases involving multiple statutes were divided into separate observations, one for each statute. Q. 197, 202 (2004) ), these estimates are highly dependent upon model specification in the DW-NOMINATE estimation procedure (Poole & Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 233; Krehbiel et al., supra, at 257 n.6).
IV. MEASURING JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCES
Two measures now exist that scale judicial and congressional preferences in the same policy space, namely the Judicial Common Space estimates, reported by Lee Epstein and her collaborators, and the XTI interbranch preference estimates, reported by Michael Bailey. 25 Here, I report results using the Bailey XTI preference estimates, but virtually identical results are obtained using the Judicial Common Space estimates. 29. See STIMSON, supra note 28, at 143-49 (estimating two dimensions to the public mood, but the first dimension captures the majority of the opinion variance). In the analyses to follow, I use the first dimension mood index that is estimated from the two dimensional model.
VI. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
The model specified in Equation 1 constructs a simple horse race between the public mood index and the degree of congressional constraint on the Court, controlling for the preferences of the median justice.
(1)
The probability that the Court will issue a liberal judgment in one of the cases in our sample is modeled as a function of the preferences of the median justice, the direction and magnitude of congressional constraint on the Court, and the public mood. We expect ß 1 to be negative and significant if more liberal median justices increase the probability of a liberal judgment, we expect ß 2 to be negative and significant if more liberal congressional constraint on the Court increases the probability of a liberal judgment, and we expect ß 3 to be positive and significant if a more liberal public mood increases the probability of a liberal judgment. These coefficients are estimated for three different models of congressional decision making, both for the entire sample, and for the Rehnquist Court terms only. All models are estimated with a probit link function and robust standard errors.
30 Table 1 reports the results for the six estimated models. Simply put, there is no support for the hypothesis that public opinion affects the Court's decisions above and beyond the effects of congressional preferences; the coefficient on Public Mood t is both in the wrong direction and is insignificant for all six models.
The effects of both judicial and congressional preferences work as predicted, however. For the full sample of judgments from the 1953-2001 terms, the coefficients on both Median Justice t and Congressional Constraint t are in the predicted direction and significant at conventional thresholds. Table 2 reports simulated probabilities for both these variables at their minimum and maximum values over this period. Holding both congressional constraint and public mood at their sample means, the probability of a liberal judgment ranges from 24 to 33 percent under the most conservative median justice during this period, depending on the congressional model estimated. But under the most liberal median justice, this probability ranges from 97 to 98 percent. Increasing the liberalism of the median justice clearly has a large substantive effect on the Court's judgments. 30 . Estimates from models including additional control variables, including whether the Solicitor General represented one of the parties to a case, the amicus brief differential between those parties, and whether the party advocating the "liberal" outcome was the petitioner or respondent, are available upon request. The inclusion of these controls did not change the substance of the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 . But increasing the liberalism of Congress has an effect of similar magnitude. Holding both the preferences of the median justice and public mood at their sample means, the probability of a liberal judgment ranges from only 12 to 27 percent under the condition of the most conservative congressional constraint in the sample, depending on the congressional model estimated. But under the condition of the most liberal congressional constraint observed in the sample, the probability of a liberal judgment ranges from 86 to 94 percent. The effects of congressional preferences on the Court's decisions are as large as the effects of judicial preferences on those decisions.
We can see the effects of congressional preferences even more starkly for the Rehnquist Court terms. Because the estimated preferences of the median justice vary only slightly over these terms, they do not help us to explain the variation in the Court's judgments; the coefficient on Median Justice t is insignificant at conventional thresholds. But the coefficient on Congressional Constraint t is again significant in the predicted direction for all three models estimated. Table 2 reports that, prior to the 1994 elections, when liberal congressional constraint on the Court was at its maximum, the predicted probability of a liberal judgment is simulated at 96 percent for all three models of congressional behavior. After those elections, when liberal congressional constraint on the conservative Rehnquist Court evaporated, the probability of a liberal judgment dropped to between 16 and 21 percent.
VII. DISCUSSION
These results provide no support for the claim that public opinion has an effect on the decisions of the Supreme Court that is independent of the effects of congressional preferences. Previous studies that have found independent effects for public opinion have either failed to control for congressional preferences, or have used measures of those preferences that have been superseded by better measures.
These results indicate that the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States respond to the institutional incentives specified in the U.S. Constitution. Those incentives, perhaps particularly the congressional power of judicial removal, give the justices reason to cater to majoritarian congressional preferences. There do not appear to be sufficient incentives for the justices to respond to public opinion directly.
More generally, these results suggest that institutional design matters for the kinds of decisions we can expect from constitutional courts. If we want courts that respect majoritarian preferences-preferences that very often include robust support for civil rights and liberties-we would do well to promote institutional constraints on those courts, constraints that compel them to respond to political majorities. Absent such institutionally specified constraints, we cannot expect to see courts that respond to the "will of the people." 
